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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established in 1995 with the
purpose of extending trade disciplines to services and intellectual property
rights. To ensure the efficacy of the realization of this objective, it was
necessary to ensure that the organization has a broad membership. In the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) period (1947–1995), the
membership was small and consisted mostly of Western developed countries,
a “gentlemen’s club” of trading nations. The new WTO Agreements are
important to ensure trading opportunities for the old club members in
developing countries. Possibly even more important in ensuring a wide
membership for the WTO is guaranteeing the enforcement of intellectual
property rights on newly industrialised or industrialising countries mostly in
Asia.
Attracting countries into the WTO was done by forecasting not only trade
opportunities but also by promising a fairer trading system, ensuring the
system would promote sustainable development and that positive efforts
would be made for developing countries.
The dispute settlement system is a crucial element in the realization of the
hopes of the WTO members and the realization of the organization’s
objective. This Article will review the failure of the system to live up to the
high hopes that were created at the inauguration of the system as well as the
proposed improvements.
II. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The position of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement
system is ambivalent.1 Their position is procedurally better than in the
GATT period because the WTO is a rule-based system and not a powerbased system.2 It is generally accepted that a rule-based system with a quasijudicial dispute settlement system serves the interests of developing

1
GARY P. SAMPSON & W. BRADNEE CHAMBERS, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE WTO:
POLICY APPROACHES (2008), available at http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/sample-chapters/de
veloping_countries_and_the_WTO_web.pdf (“WTO law suffers from the same ambivalence
as WTO politics.”).
2
It is important to note that only a small number of developing countries were GATT
contracting parties. Most functioned outside the system and were therefore free to engage in
protectionist, trade-restricting, and import-substituting policies. See generally Olu Fasan,
Global Trade Law: Challenges and Options for Africa, 47 J. AFR. L. 143 (2003) (discussing
the imbalance in the WTO and how the imbalance can be dealt with so that less wealthy
countries can take advantage of a rules-based system).
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countries, least-developed countries (LDCs) and small economies better.3
Renato Ruggiero, first Director-General of the WTO, declared that the
dispute settlement system is “an important guarantee of fair trade for middlesized exporting nations.”4
But developing countries have been among the most vocal critics of the
dispute settlement system. Their confidence was already shattered by what
has been described as the betrayal of the Uruguay Round and the disregard of
their interests in the Sutherland report.5 As developing countries face an
increasingly independent and activist dispute settlement system enforcing a
substantive body of rules that they regard as biased against them, most
developing countries have become more fearful of the system and its
consequences.6 The African Group sharply notes that “in their interpretation
and application of the provisions, the panels and the Appellate Body have in
several instances exceeded their mandate and fundamentally prejudiced the
interests and rights of developing-country Members as enshrined in the WTO
Agreement.”7 Fasan writes that developing countries have become hostage
to the quasi-judicial enforcement of skewed rules.8
An impartial dispute settlement system based on legal rules may be more
advantageous to developing countries but it would be naive to assert that the
WTO is based on rules only and not on power.9 Empirical analysis suggests
that the system still reflects power-based relationships.10 The Quad
Countries (EU, U.S., Canada, and Japan) gain more out of the dispute
settlement system because they can afford to employ a full-time team to
3

See John Whalley, Developing Countries and System Strengthening in the Uruguay
Round, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 409 (Will Martin & L. Alan
Winters eds., 1996); James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries
and Institutional Change in WTO Dispute Settlement, 11 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 543 (2004)
(“Conventional wisdom suggests that moves to establish binding, third party arbitration in
international law generally favor smaller, less powerful states.”).
4
Renato Ruggiero, Dir. Gen., WTO, Address to the Korean Business Association (Apr.
17, 1977), available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/sprr_e/seoul_e.htm.
5
See Donald McRae, Developing Countries and “the Future of the WTO,” 8 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 603 (2005) (“The Uruguay Round is often portrayed as a betrayal. Developing
Countries agreed to TRIPS in exchange for a liberalization of agricultural and other trade that
never eventuated.”).
6
See generally Fasan, supra note 2 (discussing developments in the wake of the 1994
Uruguay Round).
7
Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, Proposal by the African Group,
para. 2, TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 15, 2002) [hereinafter African Group Proposal].
8
Fasan, supra note 2, at 162.
9
Asif H. Qureshi, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO, 47 J. AFR. L. 174–75
(2003).
10
See Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to GATT?
(World Bank Policy Research Paper, N° 3133, 2003).
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monitor the reports, to safeguards their rights, and to enforce their
entitlements. It is commentators from those countries that are most hostile to
strengthening procedural advantages for developing countries and LDCs.11
The current procedural set-up ostensibly based on sovereign equality hides a
weighted voting system that entrenches real power in the hands of the few.12
This “organised hypocrisy in the procedural context” serves them well and is
safeguarded by their resistance to meaningful change.13 Only a minority of
developing countries can benefit from the system. Countries like Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, China, India, Mexico, South-Africa, and Thailand are well
placed to use the system to their advantage. These countries are atypical
developing countries and are better classified as emerging economies.14
Most developing countries and all LDCs can be only be disappointed in
the system despite it being heralded as one of the great success stories.15 The
African Group, of which thirty-four members are LDCs, formulates it
succinctly: “Experience has shown that the [dispute settlement system] has
not satisfactorily and clearly aimed in its operation to contribute towards the
tangible attainment of the development objectives of the WTO
Agreement.”16 Who could disagree with former Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi’s understated observation that “[for] all its virtues, . . . [the]
system is not perfect”?17 Many developing countries, and especially LDCs,
cannot afford to mount a serious defense if they are facing a claim; let alone
identify and prepare a case.18 Only one case has ever been brought by an
LDC and not a single panellist from an LDC has been appointed.19 This
11

Ignacio Garcia-Bercero & Paolo Garzotti, DSU Reform: What Are the Underlying
Issues?, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 123, 146
(Dencho Georgiev & Kim Van der Borght eds., 2006).
12
See Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 342 (2002).
13
Id.
14
See Mohan Kumar, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Developing Country Participation
and Possible Reform, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 177, 182.
15
See Supachai Panitchpakdi, Foreword, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 9, 9; Kumar, supra note 14, at 179–80. For
statistics on participation of developing countries and LDCs, see Qureshi, supra note 9, at
173; Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, Developing Countries and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 171, 203 (1997); CONSTANTINE MICHALOPOULOS,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO 167 (2001).
16
African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 1.
17
See Panitchpakdi, supra note 15, at 9–10.
18
See Amin Alavi, African Countries and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 25
DEV. POL. REV. 25, 31–32 (2007) (noting the problem of “the rising cost of initiating litigation,
which many countries are not able to afford”).
19
Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS 306; India – Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from
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unbalanced representation in panels and the Appellate Body was noted with
concern by the African Group that stressed that a “balanced geographical
representation will assist in promoting a balanced [dispute settlement] that
reflects the various backgrounds and inherent concerns of the entire WTO
membership.”20
A few developing countries have used the opportunities offered by
intervening in dispute settlement procedures.21 India and China, for
example, actively use the third party intervention to learn the process and
train their diplomats to be better prepared. Any developing country that has
the human capacity to be so involved, even if only to observe the
proceedings as a passive observer without filing written submissions, would
be well advised to make use of this learning opportunity.22 But again, this
opportunity reveals an important difference in the level of engagement of
developing countries and the main players in the system. The EU and the
U.S., as a matter of strategy, declare a third party interest in almost every
Appellate Body Proceeding that they are not involved in as a disputant.23
The Appellate Body actively encourages such third party participation and
takes care to glean their views and opinions.24 It is, for the small number of
countries that can afford to be actively involved in every case, a valuable
opportunity to give direction to the reasoning of the Appellate Body and by
extension to the direction of WTO law.
Access to justice is thus a genuine issue for many WTO members to such
an extent that it brings the legitimacy of the system in question if it not
forcefully addressed. Hence, the system demands structural and substantive
reforms to address this if the system wants to remain credible for all WTO
members.25 Indeed, the African Group states:

Bangladesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds
306_e.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); Dispute Settlement Body, Diagnosis of the Problems
Affecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Some Ideas by Mexico, at 4, TN/DS/90 (July 16,
2007); Victor Mosoti, Africa in the First Decade of WTO Dispute Settlement, 9 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 427, 440 (2006).
20
African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 6. For a chart of the participation of African
countries in panels and the Appellate Body, see Mosoti, supra note 19, at 440.
21
Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in INT’L CTR. TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEV., TOWARDS A DEVELOPMENT-SUPPORTIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM IN
THE WTO 1, 14 (Victor Mosoti ed., 2003).
22
See Smith, supra note 3, at 554 (explaining that the Appellate Body created the passive
observer category to make it easier for developing countries to participate).
23
Id. at 561.
24
Shaffer, supra note 21, at 10–13.
25
Proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
TN/DS/W/7 (Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter LDC Group Proposal].
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It should be clearly affirmed, that the DS [dispute settlement] is
not just about expedition or speed, it is also about real justice to
all Members; and that the DS must be part of the mechanisms
for attaining the development objectives of the WTO as an
institution. Its success should be equally determined on the
basis of the extent to which findings and recommendations
fully reflect and promote the development objectives.26
III. DEVELOPING COUNTRY PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The awareness of their precarious position has led developing countries to
formulate proposals that are simultaneously defensive, attempting to restrict
the progressive strengthening of the system, and combative, fighting to
improve their own interests in the system. These include proposals to
overcome the lack of expertise and experience in the system or to address the
cost of acquiring such expertise and proposals to improve the special and
differential treatment provisions. Both these sets of proposals are discussed
in this section. Other proposals, such as those aimed at turning back some of
the developments introduced by the Appellate Body and supported by
developed countries and the proposals to change the system of enforcement
are discussed in the relevant sections.
The lack of experienced personnel is a recurring issue for developing
countries and one that is identified time and time again as a major obstacle
for developing countries in making better use of the system.27 The proposals
call for better training for civil servants from LDCs, financial support for
legal assistance, and the establishment of a not-for-profit law firm.28 Some
of these have been achieved either wholly or in part. The technical
assistance and training has been increased with donations from individual
WTO members.
Overcoming the lack of human resources by hiring private counsel proved
an issue when St. Lucia retained counsel to represent it in the Bananas Case.
Despite opposition from the U.S. and the EU, the Appellate Body allowed
the use of such private counsel, stressing its particular significance to allow
26

African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 7.
See, e.g., Fabien Besson & Racem Mehdi, Is WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased
Against Developing Countries? An Empirical Analysis 9–11 (2004) (unpublished paper
presented at the International Conference on Policy Modeling); Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A.
Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the
World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 205–35 (2002).
28
See Contribution of Jamaica to the Doha Mandated Review of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), TN/DS/W/21 (Oct. 10, 2002) [hereinafter Jamaica Contribution].
27
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full participation in dispute settlement procedures for developing countries.
It was a useful step for developing countries but one that came with
additional problems. Hiring private counsel is very costly; a cost that is
difficult to bear for developing countries.
The Advisory Centre for WTO Law was established to provide legal
assistance to developing countries and LDCs at reduced cost or in some
cases pro bono.29 Support from the most powerful members of the WTO for
this initiative is absent. In the EU, only some Member-States supported it,
notably The Netherlands as a driving force behind the initiative, but the EU
as such did not support it. Seemingly the United States, Japan, Germany,
France and the EU collectively preferred not to assist this initiative that could
support developing countries in litigating against their interests.30 The
African Group stresses that the Advisory Centre should not be regarded “as a
panacea for all institutional and human capacity constraints of developing
countries.”31 Also, the Advisory Centre only provides a service to requesting
developing countries with a viable case. Identifying violations of WTO law
and collecting pre-litigation data is beyond the Centre’s mandate and
resources.32 For most LDCs this proves a hurdle that is insurmountable.
Many developing countries are, moreover, not a member of the Advisory
Centre or perceive having the Advisory Centre as sole provider of subsidised
legal support as unfair.33
Brown and Hoekman have proposed public-private partnerships to bring
what they term the ‘missing cases’ to the WTO.34 These are cases that have
not been litigated by developing countries because of the costs associated
with WTO litigation. They propose harnessing private interests to engage
with the public sector to identify cases, bring them before the WTO dispute
settlement system, and generate public and political support to remove the
offending measures. Potential private partners that are identified, include
international law firms, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It is
suggested that international law firms can be motivated to offer pro bono
services to developing countries for self-interested reasons as well as
altruistic reasons.35 Neither offers a convincing argument why international
29
See Kim Van der Borght, The Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advancing Fairness and
Equality, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 723–28 (1999).
30
Id.; Smith, supra note 3, at 567; Chad. P. Brown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute
Settlement and the Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 875 (2005).
31
African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 2.
32
Brown & Hoekman, supra note 30, at 875.
33
Garcia-Bercero & Garzotti, supra note 11, at 147.
34
Brown & Hoekman, supra note 30, at 861.
35
Id. at 877–80.
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law firms would offer a structural solution to the lack of human and financial
resources of developing countries. This does not diminish the fruitful
cooperation that can arise in those fortuitous cases where the interests of
these law firms and the developing countries seeking their services coincide.
Similar problems are associated with issue-based NGOs. Such NGOs may
have an interest in being engaged more directly in WTO litigation to further
their agenda, but as Brown and Hoekman themselves rightly observe, “the
action of an NGO may not be aligned with the interest of the developing
country that is being used as the vehicle to publicly air the NGO’s issue.”36
Some proposals from developing countries outline methods such as the
setting up a Dispute Settlement Fund to improve access to justice by
integrating the cost of the procedure, including legal fees and costs of
experts, in the system.37 As the proposal of the African Group summarizes
it: “Every decent legal system ensures that parties that would not be able to
exercise their rights in the judicial system for financial constraints are
provided means to do so.”38
All these proposals aim at reducing the cost of litigation for developing
countries in the dispute settlement system as it exists. But proposals have
also been brought to change the system itself either by internalizing the cost
of litigation or by recognizing the difference between the Members.39
India and China have proposed that if a developing country prevails in a
case against a developed country, the developing country should recover its
litigation costs.40 It should not be surprising that EU commentators are
rather hostile to such proposals and refer to increased futile litigation, which
risks overthrowing “the delicate balance between ‘political’ and ‘quasijudicial’ arms of the WTO.”41 They only see as merit in exploring some
compensation for a reasonable amount of expenses incurred by an LDC
when a developed country is found in violation of WTO commitments in a
case brought by an LDC.42 As observed earlier, no case has ever been
brought by an LDC.
Justice for all WTO members requires that the system is not blind for the
differences of its members. The WTO Agreements contain several provisions
on Special and Differential (S&D) treatment that recognise the different
36
37

Id. at 882 n.37.
See Jamaica Contribution, supra note 28, at 3–4; African Group Proposal, supra note 7,

at 4.
38

African Group Proposal, supra note 7, at 2.
See generally WTO, South Centre, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Issues to
Consider in the DSU Negotiations, TRADE Analysis Doc. SC/TADT/TA/DS/1 (Oct. 2005).
40
See Garcia-Bercero & Garzotti, supra note 11, at 148.
41
Id.
42
Id.
39

2011]

JUSTICE IN THE WTO COURT

795

position of some WTO members, but these provisions have proved less than
effective as developing countries and LDCs are reluctant to call upon them
as it brings their weaker position into sharp focus.43 It reduces their position
of sovereign equals by tainting their rights with notions of charity.44 It also
raises the fear that when they prevail in the proceedings, it will reduce the
normative force of the ruling.45 Whereas the overall procedure is
characterised by a high level of automaticity, several S&D provisions are not
activated automatically when relevant.
The scepticism and frustration of developing countries with special and
differential treatment is shared by the Sutherland report. It calls into question
the wisdom of such discrimination but acknowledges it as a valid concept
because it is part of the GATT acquis.46 Since S&D measures are likely to
remain a political demand, the WTO should do more to make these measures
effective.
The effectiveness of existing S&D provisions was questioned by the LDC
Group with regard to Article 12.11 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) that compels a panel to explicitly indicate the form in which the S&D
rules have been taken into account. But these provisions must be activated
by the developing country by pointing out the relevant S&D to the panel.
Similarly, Article 8.10 DSU allows a developing country to request the
appointment of a developing country panellist. LDCs reject the burden
imposed on developing countries and LDCs to raise these S&D provisions on
the basis of the adage jura novit curiae—the court knows the law. The
application of such provisions should therefore not depend on a trigger from
developing countries or LDCs but it should be an obligation on panels and
the Appellate Body to respect these provisions to the full without a need
request their application.47
Jamaica argues for an effective implementation of Article 21.8 DSU that
provides that if a case is brought by a developing country, “The DSB
[Dispute Settlement Body] shall take into account not only the trade
coverage of measures complained of but also their impact on the economy of
developing-country member concerned.”48

43

Alavi, supra note 18, at 33.
See Qureshi, supra note 9, at 194.
45
See FRIEDER ROESSLER, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
COUNTRIES UNDER THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (2005).
46
McRae, supra note 5, at 604.
47
LDC Group Proposal, supra note 25, at 2.
48
Jamaica Contribution, supra note 28, at 7.
44
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The proposal extends this provision to cases that are brought against a
developing country.49 The method of implementation should, according to
the Jamaican proposal, be addressed in the panel or Appellate Body report.50
Gradually, a more pernicious concern has entered the public debate
concerning the limited participation of developing countries in the dispute
settlement system. The main trading powers have a hold over developing
countries through other agreements and arrangements, not in the least
development assistance and preferential arrangement outside the WTO
system. For developing countries, and especially for LDCs, this support can
represent an important economic factor in their foreign policy. It can
influence their position in trade negotiations, in consultations, in the decision
to request a panel, in the decision to request to activation of S&D measures
and in the feasibility of using retaliation in the event the developing country
prevails in dispute settlement proceedings. The empirical study by Zejan and
Bartels suggests a significant relationship between the initiation of disputes
by developing countries and aid they receive.51 They suggest that selfcensorship may be operating on the part of developing countries.52
IV. THE PRIMITIVE REMEDIES OF WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ARE ONLY
FOR THE STRONG MEMBERS
Disputing parties are bound by the report of a panel or the Appellate
Body once it is adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), a procedural
step that is largely a legal fiction as it occurs automatically (reversed
consensus rule). The parties are then expected to comply promptly with the
recommendations and rulings contained in the adopted report.53 The first
objective of an adopted report is always the withdrawal of the measure found
to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreements.54
If immediate
implementation is not practical, the DSU provides for a reasonable period of
time to achieve implementation.55 This period of time has to be approved by
49

Id.
Id.
51
See Pilar Zejan & Frank L. Bartels, Be Nice and Get Your Money — An Empirical
Analysis of World Trade Organization Trade Disputes and Aid, 40 J. WORLD TRADE 1021–47
(2006).
52
Id.
53
Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226, art. 21.1 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].
54
Id. art. 3.7.
55
Id. art. 21.3.
50
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the DSB and can either be determined on the basis of a proposal by the
member concerned, or it can be the time agreed by the parties.56 Failing to
reach agreement, the issue is be decided by arbitration.57 The reasonable
period of time should not exceed fifteen months.58
However, if the measure at issue is not withdrawn voluntarily, the DSU
contains several measures to coerce the party to comply with the report by
bringing its regulation in line with WTO Agreements. First, the parties can
agree on trade compensation.59 This trade compensation takes the form of
additional trade advantages but it is a voluntary agreement and cannot be
demanded as of right.60 The use of compensation is further complicated by
the rules of the DSU that are not supportive of using compensation. If trade
compensation is agreed, this additional market access is not limited to the
complaining party but is multilateralized to the entire WTO membership.
Such compensation is, moreover, unlikely to benefit the industry that was
directly affected by the contested measure. Especially in those cases where
this industry was the driving force and in some cases the financial backer of
the complaint, it would be politically impossible to agree on compensation
that does not reflect their interests.61 The difficulties in using trade
compensation have meant that it has only been used once and is not a
realistic option in the current system.62 To use trade compensation, the
complaining party first has to request retaliation as this procedure will lead
into Article 22.6 DSU to ascertain the level of nullification and impairment.
Clearly these procedures would need to be disentangled for compensation to
become a more realistic option. The EU proposes that arbitration to
determine the level of nullification and impairment should be made possible
before the request for authorisation to retaliate.63
The remedy of last resort in WTO dispute settlement is the suspension of
concessions or other obligations, in short, retaliation. Retaliatory measures
can only be taken when authorised by the DSB.64 The level of the
suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB has to
be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.65 The retaliation
56

Id. art. 21.3(a)–(b).
Id. art. 21.3(c).
58
Id.
59
Id. arts. 3.7, 22.2.
60
See id. art. 3.7 (stating that compensation can occur only after the DSB gives
authorization based on member’s request).
61
See Garcia-Bercero & Garzotti, supra note 11, at 143.
62
See EU Contribution 4 (informal working paper) (on file with the author).
63
Id. at 5.
64
DSU, supra note 53, art. 3.7.
65
Id. art. 22.4.
57
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is temporary and can only be maintained until the inconsistent measure has
been removed.66 The requesting party submits a list of measures it proposes
to take to the DSB. If the responding party objects to the proposed level of
suspension, the issue is submitted to the original panel or, if that is not
possible, to an arbitrator appointed by the Director-General.67 The arbitrator
will estimate the level of impairment as the basis for determining the
appropriate level of suspension of concessions.68
Retaliation as a method of enforcement lacks the legitimacy that the
system as a whole attempts to achieve.69 First, it contravenes the objectives
of the WTO Agreements as it does not promote predictability, a basic
principle of the system.70 Perhaps even more importantly, it leads to a
restriction of international trade. It would be more constructive and more in
line with the WTO objectives to accord additional trade advantages to the
prevailing party rather than denying trade advantages to the party that has
contravened the WTO Agreements (compulsory trade compensation).71 The
current system is, moreover, inappropriate in cases where the prevailing
party is economically much weaker as the retaliation will resort little or no
effect and is likely to harm the winning party economically.72 Most WTO
members are developing countries that cannot effectively use retaliation.
The system therefore leaves most WTO members without recourse to
enforceable justice. It also makes short shrift of one panel’s assertion that
“carrying a big stick is, in many cases, as effective a means to having one’s
way as actually using the stick.”73 True as it may be that authorisation to
suspend concessions and other obligations was granted in only 2% of cases,
the “dread factor” is only one part of the explanation.74 The dread factor
emanating from a threat with retaliation from an LDC and from many

66

Id. art. 22.8.
Id. art. 22.6; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Sanctions and Countermeasures: Do the Remedies
Make Sense?, in REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM,
supra note 11, at 37, 37–42; Jeff Waincymer, WTO LITIGATION: ASPECTS OF FORMAL DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 676–77 (2002).
68
DSU, supra note 53, art. 22.6.
69
Id.; EU Contribution, supra note 62, at 3.
70
EU Contribution, supra note 62, at 4.
71
See Bourgeois, supra note 67, at 37–42; Marco Bronckers & Naboth Van den Broek,
Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in
REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 43,
49.
72
Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 71, at 49.
73
WTO Panel Report, U.S. – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS/152/R,
Dec. 22, 1999, para. 7.89.
74
See Kumar, supra note 14, at 180.
67
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developing countries could be more accurately described as carrying a blunt
toothpick.
A further problem with the current system is the prospective nature of
retaliations and compensation. The prospective nature of remedies is an
inheritance from GATT where it was unsuccessfully challenged in 1965.75
The forward-looking remedies leave the system open to abuse by
opportunistic WTO members who can maintain WTO inconsistent protection
for their domestic industry for almost three years without the economic cost
of such protectionism ever being presented to them. After all, a party
complaining about a measure will easily have to wait thirty-two to thirty-five
months for relief through the dispute settlement system’s panel and
Appellate procedures and the expiry of the reasonable period of time.76 If the
measure after this period has not been withdrawn, it will take another 200
days to obtain a decision from the arbitrator to determine the appropriate
level of suspension. Worse still, if a new measure is taken that again installs
WTO inconsistent protection; the wait is extended by 90 to 225 days before a
panel can determine the WTO inconsistency and another 60 to 91 days for
the Appellate Body to confirm it.77 In the worst case scenario, it can take
three to four and a half years to arrive at a decision that allows the
compensation or the suspension of concessions. During these years, the
contested measure can be maintained and the economic harm mounts—
economic harm that can be difficult to recover from for economically weaker
members. It is perhaps one of the reasons why developed countries maintain
their measures until they are found to be inconsistent by a panel or the
Appellate Body twice as often as developing countries?78
A limited form of relief could consist of interim measures or preventive
measures. Such measures can bridge the time it takes to come to a final
decision and thereby avoid irreparable damage. The Mexican proposal
envisages the complaining party establishing at the outset of the procedure
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that the contested measure is causing irreparable damage and proposing
remedies to limit the harm. If the panel supports the argumentation of the
complaining party, damage-limitation measures would be taken within 30
days by the responding party. Failing that, the complaining party would be
authorised to take such measures. These measures would be in place for the
duration of the dispute settlement procedure until the DSB terminates them
or until authorisation for retaliatory measures is granted.
An interesting development in this respect occurred in Article 21.5 DSU
Panel in Australia — Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Automotive Leather.79 In this case, the panel decided that retroactive and
even punitive sanctions are possible in the WTO and based this conclusion
on the Vienna Convention on Treaties and the effectiveness of sanctions.80
The case was terminated after the parties reached a compromise and was not
later scrutinized by the DSB even after several WTO members objected to
retroactive sanctions as being contrary to the “intention of the drafters” of
Article 19 DSU.81
Australia condemned the decision as “judicial
adventurism” going beyond what is permissible under the DSU.82 The U.S.
similarly stressed that it did not “agree with every word of the panel report”
and that the panel’s remedy went beyond what they had sought.83 The
decision of the panel nevertheless has merit as it puts a stop to the “hit-andrun” abuses that the current system is open to and because it could provide
for compensation that better reflects the real harm done.84
The prospective nature of the enforcement mechanism has been criticised
in many of the reform proposals.85 Mexico has proposed to determine the
appropriate level of retaliation through arbitration from the moment the panel
report is circulated to all WTO members prior to the adoption by the DSB.
Retaliation could then be implemented from the moment of adoption. A less
radical alternative would be to start the arbitration process immediately
following the adoption of the report. The level of retaliation could moreover
be determined retrospectively from the moment the contested measure was
taken, the moment the request for consultation was notified to the DSB or the
moment the panel was established. Such retrospective determination would
constitute a shift in the relations between the parties. Currently, any delay
79
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favors the responding party. By introducing retrospective determination of
the level of retaliation, the magnitude of the retaliation increases, and
therefore the risk to the responding party increases. This shift would
promote a speedy resolution of the conflict and would diminish the risk of
abuse of the procedure.
Other proposals include collective retaliation, whereby several WTO
members would support the prevailing party in its retaliation, and negotiable
remedies that would create a market in retaliation rights.86 Neither of these
proposals is likely to find sufficient support among WTO members. They
constitute a valuable intellectual exercise to reveal problems and possibilities
rather than a serious option for the future of WTO remedies.
Collective retaliation was first proposed in GATT as part of the 1965
developing country proposals.87 Developing countries rejected the system of
bilateral retaliation as unfair and ineffective for developing countries. They
argued that collective retaliation whereby several developing countries
together could retaliate against a develop country member would yield more
results as it would have a greater economic impact. As level of retaliation is
supposed to reflect the level of economic harm; such collective retaliation
would surmount this level and would in fact be punitive.88 Developing
countries argued that the economic harm of GATT’s inconsistent measures
had a greater impact on their economies because having their access to
developed markets being restricted removes a potential for large growth on
such markets. The punitive element of collective retaliation was thus
described as a “development multiplier.”89
These ideas and their motivation have been revived in the current
proposal for the reform of WTO remedies. The African Group reiterated that
retaliation is not a practical remedy for individual developing country
Members to use against developed country Members.90 If they did, they
could suffer further economic damage themselves.91 The African Group
concludes that “this handicap of developing-country members means that the
system is skewed against them.”92 In the LDC Group proposal, the principle
of collective responsibility is advanced to multilateralize the right and
responsibility to enforce the recommendations of the DSB.93 It envisages, as
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a matter of special and differential treatment, that in cases where developing
or LDC members successfully pursued a claim, collective retaliation should
be automatically available.94 The proposal also retains the punitive elements
as it continues stating that the DSB should not be constrained by
quantification on the basis of the rule on nullification and impairment.95 The
African proposal would authorise all WTO members to retaliate collectively
against a developed member that adopts measures in breach of WTO
obligations against a developing member.96 The proposal contains a similar
increase of the level of retaliation beyond the equivalent level of nullification
and impairment of benefits.97
The proposal to create negotiable remedies would see the creation of a
market in tradable retaliation rights.98 In such a system, a prevailing party
could decide to retaliate or to convert its retaliation rights into financial
means to compensate it for the economic damage suffered by selling its
rights to another WTO member that would get access to temporary
protection of its market.99
It is, however, financial compensation that has attracted most attention in
diplomatic as well as academic discussions. The LDC Group has expressed
itself in favor of such compensation, adding that such remedy should be
collectively exercised according to the United Nations model.100 The
sanction would be taken by all WTO members. If the prevailing nation is a
developing country or LDC, the collective sanction would be instituted as a
right at the simple request of the developing country or LDC.101 The African
Group proposal also envisages financial compensation, especially to cover
the period until the withdrawal of the measures in breach of WTO
obligations.102 This compensation would not constitute an alternative to the
withdrawal of inconsistent measures.103
Bronckers and Van den Broek suggest that developing countries should
opt for financial compensation as the preferred improvement to the remedies
conundrum rather than continuing to support various options that are
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unlikely to yield a diplomatic consensus.104 Among the advantages of
financial compensation—and contrary to retaliation—is the fact that
financial compensation does not entail a restriction to international trade.
Financial compensation also avoids targeting innocent victims: economic
sectors in the WTO member country that has maintained a WTO inconsistent
measure that have no link to the dispute but are targeted by retaliation. There
is no reason to assume that financial compensation would be less efficient in
achieving compliance with the WTO Agreements; it seems certainly more
likely to be effective when a developing country or LDC prevails in a dispute
against a developed country.
The prospect of introducing financial compensation has already elicited
criticism. Financial compensation would be a fundamental change in the
system by moving away from enshrining a balance of interests as the central
plank of the WTO and placing the rule of law firmly at the centre of the
organisation thus creating legal certainty for individuals and companies
involved in international trade. Furthermore, financial compensation can be
directed at the companies that actually suffer the economic damage by
having their export opportunities curtailed by WTO inconsistent measures.
Bronckers and Van den Broek argue that financial compensation is in line
with the preambular language of the Marrakesh Agreement extolling as the
WTO objectives: “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand,
and expanding the production of goods and services.”105 They argue that
“the engine for such economic growth is fuelled by private activity, and the
WTO obligations generally limit government’s interference with this
activity.”106 The panel in US – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
similarly emphasised that:
Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as a
result of the acceptance of various disciplines under the
GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual economic
operators in the national and global market places. The
purpose of many of these disciplines, indeed one of the primary
104
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objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce certain
market conditions which would allow this individual activity to
flourish.107
Though individual economic actors are mostly responsible for the
realisation of the trade opportunities created in the framework of the WTO,
the overwhelming majority of its members are hostile to any move away
from its governmental character or to allowing their individual or corporate
citizens using the WTO Agreements in domestic actions.108 When the idea
of financial compensation was first discussed in 1965, developing countries
were unambiguous in their proposal. Financial compensation would not
serve to compensate private interests but would support the government’s
development programme.109 It seems this attitude has not changed but it is
noteworthy that the African proposal—that is supportive of some forms of
monetary compensation—refers to the interests and injury suffered by
industries of developing-country members.110
Some fears have been raised that financial compensation would open the
door for industrial countries to use it as an alternative to implementing the
ruling and recommendation of adopted reports and keeping their inconsistent
measures in place. But this argument is equally valid for retaliation where
some countries seem to assume that “paying the price”; in casu bearing the
cost of retaliation is equivalent to complying with the decision. It should be
clear that this is not a matter of choice. Adopted reports have to be
implemented promptly, paying the price in the form of financial
compensation or bearing the cost of retaliation is not an equivalent
alternative.
A further concern is that being forced to pay financial compensation
would be a bitter blow for developing countries and LDCs. None of the
proposals from developing countries or LDCs include an obligation on
themselves to be forced to pay financial compensation. The proposal is
always asymmetrical. Bronckers and Van den Broek recognise the problem
but rather suggest a solution that maintains symmetry. In this scenario, LDCs
would be temporarily exempted from having to pay financial compensation
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and developing countries would have the choice not to pay
compensation but would then also not have the right to request
compensation.111 A special S&D rule is further proposed
developing countries could be exempted from having to pay
compensation in a specific case on the basis of a reasoned request.
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V. CONCLUSION
The procedure of dispute settlement in the WTO has been described as
the crown jewel of the organisation largely for its judicial features. The
system has compulsory jurisdiction and enforcement measures. But the
judicial nature of the system is in question in the review process.
Determining the future direction of the system will depend on whether the
members support a mature judicial system or prefer to keep diplomatic
control. The current U.S. administration is supportive of a strong,
transparent dispute settlement procedure as long as they can opt to ignore its
outcome by “paying the price.” This is a highly objectionable position as it
does not promote the rule of law in international economic relations and
reinforces the view of developing countries that the system is skewed against
them.
Developing countries often oppose a strengthening of the judicial nature
as they want to maintain the WTO as an intergovernmental organisation
whose decisionmaking procedures in dispute settlement should not be overly
transparent. This is an unfortunate view as transparency could highlight the
questionable legitimacy of the substantive rules of the organisation. It would
be hard to argue that the WTO pursues substantive justice for all its
members. In that sense, the reluctance of developing country members to
strengthen a procedure to enforce these rules is justified.
This dichotomy between substantive and procedural justice is the major
challenge. Creating an exemplary dispute settlement procedure to enforce
rules that are questionable from the point of view of developing countries
and that, moreover, offers a qualitatively different access to justice for
developing and industrialised countries, is a cynical exercise. The Doha
Development Round should address both the substantive and procedural
concerns so that the dispute settlement system can be strengthened to support
the rule of law for the benefit of all WTO members. At present, such a move
seems unlikely and the review is probably going to result in minor
procedural improvements rather than addressing the major issues. This will
give rise to disappointment for developing countries—the majority of the
111
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WTO membership. It also constitutes a denial of developed countries’
responsibilities that form part and parcel of globalisation thereby
endangering economic globalisation and undermining further its legitimacy
to the detriment of all WTO members.

